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Strategy Choices in Electoral Competition 
GID EO DORO 
URION 
Tel Aviv University 
Introduction 
Political parties competing for power in democracies utilize electroni 
and printed media in order to affect the behavior of potential voter s. Carn~ 
paign managers in each of the competing parties have to decide how to 
allocate effectively and available resources so that their invest ment yields 
the highest returns in terms of votes . 
In principle they could select one of the following two bas ic patterns of 
spending. In the first mode, the "positive strategy" they invest in an effort 
to transmit images of themselves so that the party looks attrac tive to the 
voters. The second alternative, the 'negative strategy' is a for m of cam. 
paigning in which one party attacks the other or others by emphas izing their 
various disadvantages. Successful utilization of this campaig n method 
would render the opponents unattractive to potential voters. The aggres ive 
party may thus benefit from voters who negate the other part ies and vote 
for it. The initiating party may also benefit indirectly by weake ning other 
parties because affected voters would deny their support of main rivals, 
either by voting for others or abstaining totally. A certain composite of 
these two types of pure strategies is possible. 
Our understanding of political processe s will increase if we are cogni-
zant of conditions that underlie the choice of a given campaig n strategy. 
The first section of the article describes a framework for a ratio nal model 
for a choice of a campaign strategy. The second part provides evidence for 
the theoretical expositions outlined . The supportive data is brought from 
the Israeli political context. 
A. A Design for Optimal Competitive Campaign Strategy 
A party competing in a political election my choose either one of the 
following strategies or a composite of both : a positive strategy in which 
leaders, ideologies, issues and actions are described in the most attractive 
manner; a negative strategy-in which leaders, ideologies, issues and ac-
tions of other parties are described in the most derogatory manner. The in-
tensity of the campaign and the specific points of concentration are depend-
ent upon the intrinsic style of the political game in a given system . 
Political campaigning when conducted through the elect ronic and 
printed medium is similar in many ways to commercial advertis ing. An 
analogy can be drawn between firms and political parties, both attempting 
to affect people's choice by advertising in a direction compatible with their 
interests. ' The following expands on this analogy. 
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Characteristics of the Political and Economic Markets 
The main difference between political and economic markets, is that in 
he first the expression of preferences is required at greater intervals than in 
the latter. In this sense, a decision to buy a car every four years has many 
1 
lements of a decision to vote for a political party during the same interval. 
~here are several firms competing for consumer attention, offering a variety 
of models, and using multi-demensional emphasis to show the advantages 
of their car, with or without reference to other firms or models. 
Likewise in politics, several parties competing for voters' attention offer 
different leaders and issues incorporating multi-dimensional space which 
are een as relevant to the voters. Safety or security, comfort or welfare, 
reliability or credibility etc., are variables common to both markets by 
which a person makes his choice. The message in both is clear: a choice for 
u will increase your utility more than a choice for others. Alternatively, if 
you do not choose us, do not choose at all. 
This message is transmitted through advertising. Of course, political 
choosers cast a ballot only once during the said interval while economic 
choosers can enter the market at any given time. This influences the intensity 
of the campaign but not its nature. In both cases the competition is con-
ducted primarily over market share. 2 Each party or firm tries to attract 
cu tomers from other parties while maintaining their own. In addition, ex-
ten ive advertising coupled with the laws and regulations designed in each 
y tern to guarantee "fairness" in the name of "public interest," sets a bar-
rier for new firms or parties to enter the game. 3 A political example of such 
a barrier is the threshold percentage,• and regulation design to allocate 
ad ertising time at given spots to parties on television and radio. 
Positive campaign strategy is aimed not only at strengthening loyalty of 
upporters, but also it is designed to provide information to attract the in-
decisive, confused voters, known as floating voters (F. V .) by affecting their 
choice of party. 
egative Campaign Strategy 
egative strategy is a competitive campaign technique where one party 
points out the disadvantage of voting for other parties. There exists a 
tendency to dramatize the adverse implications of voting for the other party. 
An extreme example of this approach is an all out attack on rivals without 
revealing the source of the attack. The effectiveness of such strategy will be 
di cussed . 
egative strategy is instrumental in setting the tone and the pace of the 
electoral race. A party wishing to affect the order of issues that are con-
sidered in the public agenda could initiate it through negative strategy. 
Thu , for example a small party who has little to offer to the public beyond 
what is already being offered by large parties, may concentrate on the per-
sonalities of the other parties leaders. The leader's character and conduct 
may become an issue of high priority in the competition. The initiators may 
benefit from this development. 
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The competitive strategy is more prevalent in politics than in busines 
This is because there exists less restriction on the nature of cam pa igning r 
the political arena. In politics there is no regulation equivalent to " truth t 
advertising" which sets restriction on the content of commerci al advertising~ 
The principle target population of competitive strategy is the floatin 
voters, i.e. potential voters not allied strongly with one of the competing 
parties. By effectively presenting its position, the party attem pt s to lure th: 
floater to cast his vote for it. It is easier, however, to affect the F. V. that 
leans toward you. Hence, by attacking others, the party increases the 
solidarity among the ranks of her potential supporters . These floaters may 
decide to vote for the party because of the threat from the " common 
enemy." The images of such an enemy helps individuals who lean toward 
the party to close the gap between their differences. They rea lize that they 
share more common interest than not. 
The floaters leaning towards a party may realize because of informa. 
tion transmitted to them, that personal change incurred by sup porting the 
rivals would be greater than a choice for the party. 
Comparison of Strategies 
Research conducted in the area of commercial advertising showed that 
positive and negative strategies have similar effects on consu mer choice of 
products. 6 Since these studies did not differentiate betwee n the various 
characteristics of the purchasing individuals, it is possible that different 
people are affected differently by alternative types of advertisi ng. 
For the analytical purpose of this study a distinction betwee n types of 
campaign strategie is drawn. The aim of the positive campaig n strategy is 
said to strengthen the loyalty of party supporters. Individua ls identifying 
and relating to the party even in a weak sense ("leaning tow ard " ) receive 
continuous information from the party. This increases the pro bability that 
the supporters will continue to be loyal to the party on the dec isive day. 
Conversely negative political campaigning is aimed primari ly at turning 
floaters against the other parties. It is designed to make other parties sup-
porters dis loyal to their parties. More specifically its main purpose is to 
make the indecisive voters who lean toward other parties even more in-
decisive. If effective, then, floaters may decide to cast their votes for the 
party that initiated the attack . The positive strategy will pull them into 
voting for it. 
In extreme cases, a party may be under attack without knowing who 
generated it. The logic behind such an approach is not always clear. It is 
aimed presumably at creating an atmosphere which is general ly negative 
concerning the attacked party. The vote maximizer manager, using such ap· 
proach, often fails to realize his investment into votes. Yet, if resource are 
excessively available and the party wishes to maintain a "cle an" image 
while weakening the others, then this method seems reasonab le. 
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~ e Preference Distribution of Floating Voters 
I ff, As mentioned before the main purpose of negative strategy is to affect 
he choices of the floating voters in the direction of the initiating party. The 
1 
e ources that will be directed toward this sector, and the nature of the cam-
r aign depends on the preference distribution of these voters. In order to ad-
~ance through the analysis certain assumptions concerning the preference 
distribution of the floating voters has to be made. 
first, it is being assumed that the preferences of the F. V. are not 
uniformly distributed across the political space. People choose a party for a 
variety of reasons: ideological stands, specific issues, social and economic 
tatus, education and other relevant variables. This constitutes a multi-
dimensional space of attitudinal variables relevant to voting behavior. In 
this space preferences are grouped by one or another dimension or by their 
rossroads. In the broadest sense these crossroads of dimensions constitute 
a political market. If, for example, voter emphasis is primarily economically 
orientated, then a political market for parties from the right, center and left 
is identified. On the other hand, if the relevant dimension is the orientation 
towards the issue of state and church, it constitutes a market of secular 
voters and one of religious voters. 
Parties may wish, of course, to compete in each market. Yet, the vote 
maximizer manager cannot usually provide an adviser for such an ap-
proach. This is because some of these markets have opposing stands, hence, 
with given resources the party has to concentrate in these markets where it 
can establish relative advantage over other parties. The manager thus tries 
to win most of the voters in each market that he chose to compete. It 
follows, that in reality Down's vote maximization assumption is identical 
with Riker's plurality maximization assumption.' Few parties, however, 
were able to play in relative success in contradictory markets, most notably 
the National Socialist German party, and the Italian Fascists. The move-
ment of voters in the market, is mainly within the boundaries of the given 
market.• In time, of course, voters may decide to cross boundaries. 
The aforementioned assumption is extended somewhat by permitting 
the number of F.V. included in each of the political markets to vary. 
Variation in size, i.e. the density function of the F. V. according to their 
preference depends on the size of the parties included in a given market 
category. The size of a party in a given market, is in turn, determined by the 
ubjective estimation of party managers and followers concerning the 
number of voters for the party on election day. In a relatively stable 
political system, an indicator for party size could be the number of votes 
received in the previous election, other size indicators could be the outcome 
of public polls, the results of primary elections etc. 
The concept of political market need not be based on the common 
as umption of normality in the distribution of preferences over the entire 
political space prevalent in many of the voting behavior studies. On the con-
trary, the universal convention that places, for example, communist parties 
139 
in the extreme left edge of an ideological spectrum is not necessarily ern. 
pirically meaningful. It is the subjective perception of party manag ers and 
followers that determines the boundaries of a given political mark et. To be 
more specific, the ICP in Italy is for all analytical and practical purposes 
located in the same market with the Christian Democrats. Some observers 
see little difference between the ICP and a conventional Social Democratic 
party such as those prevalent in Western Europe. 9 In Isreal the situation is 
similar, the Labor-leftist and the Likud-rightist labeled parties, are both 
center parties which attempt to appeal to the same voters with the aid of dif. 
ferent labels. 10 
The distribution of preference of floaters is then dynamic in nature and 
varies in accordance with the probability estimation of the size of the poten-
tial voters for each party. Since in reality, political spaces are multi-
dimensional, party managers are faced with the problem of est imating 
precisely the size of the preference groupings. However, it can be deduced 
that the size of the F. V. stands in direct relation to the number of the party's 
potential voters ("bandwagon effect"). Above a large party the re exists a 
large cloud of F. V. and above the small party a small cloud. 
Based on the above assumptions and their logical implicati ons, four 
working hypotheses are defined in order to aid in the constructio n of a ra-
tional choice model for the selection of campaign strategy. The hypotheses 
are as follows: 
1 . F. V. will tend to abstain from voting for a party that according to objec-
tive estimation her future impact on the political system is low. 
2. The larger the party the more floaters will lean toward it. F. V .' are low in 
their ideological articulation. This constitutes a tendency amo ng them to 
join large parties-'supermarkets' of ideas, values, perso nalities, etc., 
and refrain from joining small parties which offer "specia l services." 
3. The more floating voters there are over a large party the highe r the prob-
ability that they may be convinced to vote for other parties, i.e., other 
than the party that they originally 'leaned towards.' 
4. The reverse hypothesis is true for a small party. The fewer the number of 
F. V. over a small party, the less frequently they will tend to cross the 
boundaries of their market. 
A Rational Choice Model for Campaign Strategy 
The discussion thus far provides the basis for a definition o f several 
generalizations concerning the direction and the scope of uti lizing the 
negative stragegy. 
Independent of the amount of resources allocated for the competitive 
strategy the resources would be distributed in accordance with the following 
decision rule: you attack the largest party which is positione d nearest to 
you. We can probably demonstrate this rule best by an analogy with an ap-
ple tree. One shakes the closest tree with the most apples so that they will 
fall next to him. 
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Therefore, the proportion of resources directed to negative and 
itive advertisements is a function of the size of party x, the size of the 
pornpetitor y, and the distance between them in the political space. Again, 
~~e apple tree analogy could assist in understanding the extent of effort 
(resources) invested by the shaker (party x) depe~ds on the sha~er's str_ength 
( ize), the size of t~e tree (party Y? and the location of the tree m :elation to 
, territorial location. If the tree 1s located far away from x's territory, then 
.1 rnaY be the case that while x is shaking it (negative advertising) the apples 
~ay fall on others' teritories (parties z, v, w, ... ). It is clear then that the 
ubject of the attack should be a member of the same political market as the 
arty that initiates the attack. 
p This principle of "minimal campaign effort" may be generalized as 
follows: each party according to its size would spend more resources attack-
ing the largest party which is nearest to it. This implies maximum efficiency 
and rationality in the selection of campaign target. For convenience we label 
thi rule as "rational competitive strategy (RCS)." 
A small party, for the point of view of potential supporters, that in-
ve t resources in attacking another small party located in a different 
political market, violates this principle. If rationality is defined as a goal 
oriented behavior, and the goal is as posited in this study-vote maximiza-
tion, then the small party behaved in an irrational manner. 11 This conclusion 
i al o reinforced earlier by results of low probability for large numbers of 
F. v. joining a small party. Likewise, the result holds for a large party. A 
large party that attacks another party located far away from it also behaves 
irrationally. Parties should attack each other if and only if they identify 
themselves as located in the same market. That is, a party should attack 
only if it is expected that it will benefit by the numbers of additional voters, 
a a result of the attack. 
Model (A) is a translation of the above principle: 





the size of party i. 
the size of party j. 
the distance between i and j as perceived by the party campaign 
manager. 
Aij increase in linear relation to the size of Mi and Mj and adversely 
with the size of Rij. 
Constraints on the Value of the Model Variables 
Model (A) summarizes the RCS Rule. Yet, at least two situations limits 
the scope of its selection. They involve the size of parties in the competition. 
I. The manager of Mi may conclude after calculating the costs and 
benefits of the attack that is is not warranted to allocate the resources 
for the additional votes; at the same time denying free advertising to the 
small party. 
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2. If party Mi is dominant in size and location in the politica l space it Will 
not employ the negative strategy. Mi may decide against prov iding fre 
exposure to smaller parties. e 
Model (A) is thus constrained by marginality calculations. Its limit s are: 
Mj Mi Mk where j is a value for a very small party and k a val ue for aver 
large (dominant) party. y 
Alternative Rational Choice Strategies 
Reality is often too complex to be captured by a parsimo nious model. 
The choice of RCS is aimed at the maximization of voting ret urn s. Panie 
in reality may have other goals while campaigning. Three such possibilities 
are pre ented next. 
1. A small party Mi may attack a large party Mj even if campaign 
managers estimate that they will not directly benefit from the attack. 
The reason for such behavior involves post-election calcu la tion . M· 
may think about joining a coalition with a large third pa rty (Mk/ 
Therefore they would help advance this common interest by attacking 
Mj, another large party. Mi and the third party Mk may get closer to 
their goal merely by affecting choices of the F. V. 's of Mj and causing 
them to abstain from voting. 
2. When the political system is constructed by two big parties Mi and M· 
and several small ones, the big parties may present the competitio~ 
among them as a 'zero sum game.' They thus ignore all othe r partie in 
an attempt to convince the voters that their competitio n is the 'only 
game in town.' 
3. A party may not behave in accordance with the RCS simp ly becau e it 
campaign manager erred in his judgment, when estimating the size of 
the parties, his own and the opposition . 12 He may also be mistaken in 
identifying the location of the other parties relative to his ow n, thinking 
that they are located in his own political market. 
Model (A) is an attempt to rigorously specify a decision rule for a 
political manager. It answers the questions, who to attack and wha t portion 
of the resources to allocate for that purpose. The manager may decide, of 
course, not to attack any of the competing parties and utilize only the 
positive campaign strategy. But, once he decides to go on the offensive 
against the others we expect that he would follow the RCS. 
The purpose of the following examination is indicative in nature. It 
should support the validity of our argument. We have therefore selected the 
'most difficult test case': the Israeli political system, with the supposition 
that if the model applies there, it would be ea ier to support it in other 
cases. 11 
Model (A) includes three concepts: party size, distance betwee n partie , 
and negative campaigning. We define them as follows: 
Party size: The number of potential voters for a party at the t ime inter-
val nearest to election day . In formation for size coul d be acquired 
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through public opinion polls. In a stable political system the size of the 
party in the last election may indicate size in coming election. 
Distance: A hypothetical position of a party relative to their parties as it 
is perceived by the public at a given time. Indicators for distance are 
problematic in nature since they usually rely on information that 
reflects cardinal evaluation of the positions of parties. For our purpose 
a simple ordering will suffice. 
Negative campaign: Defined nominally as a form of political advertis-
ing in which one party attacks the others by referring to the latter's 
disadvantages. 
In addition a political market is defined as a group of parties perceived 
by voters as possible substitutes for each other. Usually they appear in 
the voters' order of preference, consecutively in the first, second, and 
third place. 
Two election races to the Israeli Parliament (Knesset) were examined, 
the 1969, and the 1981 competitions. While many parties (up to 36 in 1981) 
usually qualify for the national race, no more than 12 parties were able to 
gain more than I 07o of the votes as required by the threshold percentage. 
None of the parties were ever able to receive an absolute majority in the 
Knessett. The labor Alignment together with its Arab affiliated parties came 
closest in 1969 with 60 seats out of the 61 required for an absolute domina-
tion. 
The two cases selected are structurally different. In I 969 the political 
system was modeled in what was labelled as "a dominant party system." 14 
The Labor Alignment was the largest in size and was located in the center of 
the political space.' s Its size was twice the size of the second largest party 
GAHAL forerunner of the Likud party, which in turn was twofold greater 
than the third largest party the National Religious Party (N.R.P.). None of 
the other parties represented in the Knesset was able to capture more than 
4% of the electoral support. 
The system in the October election of 1981, was more similar in struc-
ture to the British two-party system. Two major parties almost equal in size, 
48 seats for the Likud and 47 for the Labor party, dominated the race. The 
other parties shared amongst themselves the remaining 24 seats. 
To establish an indicator for distance based on orderly information we 
follow Axelrod's method utilized in the Italian context and Zelikter's ap-
plied to Isreal.•• The setting presented in table one reflects 'political 
markets' located in two spaces. The first space is defined by left/right 
dimension which includes orientation towards the economy and security of 
Israel. The other market defined by a religious/secular dimension. This 
location presented in table one is consistent with the observation of several 
students of lsreali politics. 11 Table I also presents the sizes of the parties 
in each of the markets identified in the two elections examined. 
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Table I. Distribution of Knesset Seats by Political Markets, 1969 and 1981. 
SECULAR PART IES 
Sociali st-Liberal 
1981: Communi sts Labor Ratz 
4 47 
I 2 
1969: Com. Maki Az Labor + Arab 
Affiliated 
3 I 2 56 + 4 
Key: {I) MAKI-Zioni st Communi st Party 
(2) Haolam Ha'ze 
(3) IL - Independent Liberal s 
(4) NRP-National Religiou s Party 
(5) PAI-Poalei Agudat Israel 








Telem Likud Tchiya 
2 48 3 
State GAHAL Free 
List Center 
4 26 2 
RELIGOUS PARTI ES 
Zioni st Non-Zioni st 
Tami N.R.P.• Agudat Israel 
3 6 4 
N.R .P. PAP AI 6 
12 2 4 
Source: Th e Central Bureau of Stati stics , Results of the 10th Knesset Election (30.6.1981) First Detailed Summar y , Prime 
Mini ster' s Offi ce , State o f Israel , Jeru salem, October, 1981, Table 2, p. 36 . 
"St' 
'<f' 
Data for the negative campaign was compiled from party adver-
. rnents in the largest evening paper 'Yediot Archronit.' We have 
useasured in square inches the area of the advertisement devoted to attack-
'.11e Lhe other parties relative to its total press advertisement outlay. There 
in!re two reasons for selecting the press on the sole representative of 
we ative expressions. First, in 1969 there was no political advertising on the 
ng d h 1. . . h . d 
1 raeli television. Secon , t ere are regu at10ns restnctmg t e time an con-
nt of political advertising. Since the press is freer than the television and ~~e radio from such restrictions it reflects more accurately the allocative 
decision of party managers. 
The 1969 election was less intensive than the one in 1981. Intensity was 
lower because the winner was certain from the onset and the rivals tried only 
to increase their margins. Also, most of the Israeli parties participated in a 
"wall to wall" coalition, a national unity government, and had planned to 
continue this arrangement after the election. During the month that preceded 
Lhe election, the Labor Alignment directed only 3% of its resources toward 
the negative strategy. It ignored all other parties except the right wing 
GAHAL. This small percentage was spent only during the last two weeks of 
Lhe campaign. Clearly, the Labor campaign managers had followed 
F.D.R.'s advice of not providing to the public free information on small 
parties. Conversely, the GAHAL bloc spent more than half of its resources 
attacking the labor. In the first two weeks it utilized 75% of that period 
advertising budget for negative campaigning. During the last two weeks no 
Jess than 50 percent was directed towards that goal. 
GAHAL, located in the same corner of the market as the Free Center, 
behaved as a major party should with a minor party-they ignored them 
totally. The Free Center also behaved according to our decision rule, it at-
tacked GAHAL with almost half of its negative campaign resources. The 
Free Center, however, an opposition party outside the national unity coali-
tion, attacked the Labor party with the remainder of its resources. Accord-
ing to our analysis, such an attack was a mistake and therefore a waste. The 
Alignment although big is located too far from the Free Center, for it to 
benefit from the fruits of a successful attack. 
The State list, a splinter party of the labor bloc, headed by Ben Gurion 
formerly Israel's prime minister, employed their negative strategy as 
predicted, concentrating exclusively on the Alignment. Other parties in the 
race followed a different rational counter to the vote maximization goal. 
The Independent Liberals and the HaOlam He'ze parties attacked the 
.R.P. while the first invested only 10% of its campaign resources in the 
negative advertisement leaving 90% for positive presentation of themselves. 
The latter invested all of its resources against the religious party. It utilized 
it weekly magazine published under the same name HaOlam Ha'ze as an 
organ for publicizing their advantages. It is clear, that these two anti-
religious parties tried to score points by emphasizing their secular unique-
ness. Yet, the logic of our analysis indicates that they played ball in the 
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wrong field, since the returns for their investment could not come fr 
voters affected by their campaign. orn 
The 1981 election race was probably the most intensive race in Israel' 
short democratic history . Six months before the election it was predict ~ 
that the Labor, now the opposition party, would regain its streng th and w: 
decisively. As election day approached its margin of victory graduait 
withered away, and certain polls indicated a possible loss. The party had i Y 
vested 42% of its campaign resources in the press, using the negatt 
strategy. The Likud, now the incumbent invested only 12.2% for that Pur~ 
pose. Both parties behaved as predicted by model (A), attacking each other 
and ignoring all small parties in the race. 
The small parties with the important exception of N . R.P . also behaved 
as predicted. Shinui, for example, attacked the Labor which is the largest 
party closest to it with 86% of his resources used for the negat ive purpose. 
The rest was spent against the Likud. Telem, headed by Daya n a prominent 
leader of the Labor bloc, who also served as Begin's minister of foreign af. 
fairs, led a campaign against the Labor with 59% of its reso urces and 
against the Likud with 41 OJo. Tami, a splinter of the N .R.P . who draws its 
support from the oriental religious voters, concentrated exclusiv ely on at-
tacking its big sister the N.R.P. 
The N .R. P. which lost half of its power in the election is the major ex-
ception to the decision rule described in this study. The N .R .P . split its 
negative campaign resources attacking three parties: Tami (36% ), Tchiya 
(36%) and Shinui (28%). The first target is predictable. The seco nd target 
could hardly be explained by the N. R. P. motivating fear that the 
Tchiya-an ultra nationalist party wou ld draw support from the traditional 
voters of the N.R.P. Attacking the third party was a mistake. The N.R.P . 
could not possibly gain any vote from defectors from Shinui. More over, the 
N .R.P. who started the campaign was the third largest party of Israel (after 
the collapse of the Democratic Movement for Change, DMC) should not 
have paid so much attention to its new rivals who became major. 
Conclusion 
The foregoing study provides a logical formalization of a pa rty' s cam-
paign manager decision rule. In essence it argued that while pol itical cam-
paigning need not be negative, when it is, the manager should follow the 
guidance of our model identifying his targets. The analysis, how ever, ig-
nored an important question: How effective is a campaign th rough the 
media in general, and by utilizing the negative strategy in partic ular? 
We know what many variables including the campaign affect peoples' 
choice of a party. We also know that commercial advertising is usually 
designed for market share competition. This knowledge applied to the con-
text of our analysis means that negative strategy if effective, would be so 
only when utilized in relevant political markets. 
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It cannot be argued, however, that parties that did not use the guidance 
f the manager's rule were affected negatively, i.e. lost popular support. 
~et, the two election cases examined consistently provide indications in this 
direction. Parties erring in identifying their relevant rivals wasted resources 
nd Jost or at least did not gain additional voters support. 
a Moreover, since the electoral competition in the political market 
resembles a zero sum game, it can be argued that the effect of a successful 
utilization of the negative strategy by the various parties is to a large degree 
being cancelled. This is because parties applying this strategy against each 
other may attract some support from floating voters of the other parties, 
while at the same time losing some of its potential voters to them. 11 
This situation could clearly be considered as a waste in resources. Yet 
the involved parties, even if aware of this cancelling effect, may not be able 
10 arrive at an agreement to stop utilizing this strategy. There is always a 
trong incentive for one of the parties to break the agreement and try to get 
additional votes by attacking the others. The purpose of campaign regula-
tion is to put a legal lid on the intensity of the competition. 
In such a situation measurement of effectiveness is limited in value. For 
our analytical purpose it was enough to assume that if party managers 
believe that the negative strategy is effective, then our decision rule would 
assist them in the selection of their targets. 
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'See, James M. Ferguson, Advertising and Competiti<1n: Theory, Measurement F. 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1974). ' ac-t 
'That the purpose of advertising is the competition over market shares is a r" 
hypothesis in the Marketing literature . See, for example, Richard Schmalensee, The Eco~0
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' See, Walter Mondel, The Accpuntability o/ Power (1:'lew York : David McKay, 1975 
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